The capabilities of network technologies have facilitated the growth of electronic commerce. Major issues, notably security and product quality uncertainty, still pose serious challenges to the further adoption of electronic commerce. Traditional market transactions have a long history and well-understood protections for buyers and sellers. In the electronic markets, formal and informal mechanisms such as trusted third parties (TTP) have emerged trying to ensure safe transactions. In this paper we investigate under what conditions people will stick to the traditional market and face-to-face transactions, and under what conditions electronic transactions will be the convention of the future. Of particular interest is the role of trusted third parties in facilitating online transactions. Using evolutionary game theory, we present an analytical model of buyer and seller choices and examine which patterns of transactions can be sustained. We further study how the traders' adaptive behavior may influence the outcome of the market evolution. Through this analysis, we demonstrate that the market will show divergence: for commodity products, electronic transactions through TTPs will get established as the convention for market transactions when traders use historical information about other traders' past strategies. For "look and feel" products, the market evolution depends on the initial distribution of the transaction strategies in the population.
Introduction
Over the past few years, Internet fraud continues to rise, causing consumers to become wary of online transactions. According to the FBI's Internet Fraud Complaint Center, the center referred three times as many complaints to law enforcement agencies reported offenses, accounting for 46% of referred complaints, followed by non-delivery and nonpayment of merchandise (31% of complaints) [38] . Obviously, with the growth of electronic transactions, online fraud is rising at an alarming speed, significantly affecting consumer trust towards electronic commerce and posing serious threats to the increased participation in electronic markets.
Recognizing the potentially damaging effects of online fraud on electronic commerce and responding to the need of promoting trust and creating a safe online transaction environment [8, 27, 29] , many researchers have begun to look into the role of various formal or informal mechanisms to encourage trustworthiness and reduce risks in the electronic market [5, 6, 11, 19, 29, 30] .
Trusted third parties (TTP) such as escrow.com and VeriSign have also emerged. Are they able to facilitate the growth of electronic markets? What are the theoretical justifications to the existence of these services?
In this paper, we study the evolution of transaction conventions, whereby a convention is defined as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where everybody continues to play the same strategy, barring errors or experiments [45] . Using both simulation and analytical modeling, we study how transaction models evolve depending on product characteristics and the information available to market participants and attempt to show through the dynamics of the market evolution process which transaction model (equilibrium) will be established, among several models, as the convention in the future.
In addition, we will show that an important determinant in the evolutionary process is the manner in which people adapt their behavior. As a result, we investigate whether different models of behavioral change give rise to different outcomes of the market evolution. Through this analysis, we hope to provide insights to how e-commerce companies should position and manage their transaction models for competitive advantage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we summarize current trusted third party models and their roles in electronic markets, which explains the payoff structure involving TTPs in our basic model of the transaction game. Section three briefly reviews two main factors that affect market dynamics: product characteristics and market participants' learning paradigms. These two factors provide the basis for our simulation and analytical model. Section four describes the model of the transaction game with different strategies, and analyzes the evolution of the market under two different learning paradigms and different product characteristics. The first learning paradigm is analyzed using simulation, the second using an analytical tool that identifies the stochastically stable equilibrium. Also, we examine how product characteristics affect the evolutionary process and the ensuing equilibrium. Section six discusses the factors critical to the transformation from traditional to electronic markets and concludes the paper.
Trusted Third Parties in the Electronic Market
The presence of asymmetric information contributes to the fundamental lack of faith between most businesses and consumers on the web today [24] . Buyers inevitably face many difficulties in selecting reliable sellers and quality products, which in turn produces the lemons problem [1] , whereby bad products drive out good products due to asymmetric information such as product quality uncertainty. Sellers may face the problem of nonpayment for merchandise, the usage of stolen credit cards, or illegitimate returns of swapped merchandise by the buyers. Thus, there is the need for institutional setups that can encourage trustworthiness among trading partners, minimize misrepresentation of product offerings, and encourage consumer confidence in online markets.
Many researchers are exploring the role of intermediaries or trusted third parties in electronic markets. Sarkar et al. [40] propose that widely available information infrastructures will not only reinforce the position of traditional intermediaries, but also promote the growth of a new generation of "cybermediaries". Regarding the problem of asymmetric information, some research has proposed empowering customers engaged in electronic commerce, by providing access to more advanced and powerful technological tools to conduct business transactions (e.g., [13, 35, 41] ). Lee and Yoo [30] focus on the problem of quality discovery in the trade of physical goods in electronic markets. They argue that a third party mechanism can provide quality inspection, therefore, solving the lemons problem. In other words, a trusted third party mechanism can help an auctioneer successfully implement an electronic auction market for goods with complex attributes.
Ba et al. [5] spell out an analytical design of a trusted third party from an economic incentive perspective to deal with the issue of information asymmetry and to encourage and maintain trustworthiness, vital to the growth of electronic commerce. Hu et al. [26] study a special type of TTPs, online escrow service providers, and provide guidelines for online escrow service providers to establish an optimal pricing strategy. Ba and Pavlou [4] use customer feedback data from eBay to illustrate that feedback systems may serve as a TTP that enhances a seller's trust evaluation among buyers, thus generating price premiums for the seller. Resnick et al. [37] also note that eBay attributes its high rate of successful transactions to its Feedback Forum.
In practice, systems designed to facilitate online transactions have also emerged.
Currently there are several intermediaries that serve as TTPs to disseminate online product quality information or to ensure safe transactions. For example, escrow.com acts as a TTP for online auction buyers and sellers by managing the payment process during a transaction. Bizrate (www.bizrate.com) uses information from consumers to keep track of merchants' reputations. iExchange (www.iExchange.com) monitors reputations of stock market analysts according to the performance of their picks. Although these intermediaries conduct their services in certain business settings, they all utilize the idea of externalizing private knowledge to reduce asymmetric information in the electronic market, thus reducing online transaction risks and promoting the welfare of their users.
Given the various transaction models available, how will the market evolve? Will the TTP model thrive in the electronic market? Although TTP services may increase the payoffs of their users [4, 30, 37] , online users currently do not use those services as often as expected [15, 26] . Similarly, the commonly accepted assumption that operating an electronic channel is more cost effective for commodity products than maintaining a physical presence does not necessarily imply that electronic transactions will be the new convention. Even though everyone would be better off with an electronic channel in this instance, it might be hard to change from a former convention to a new convention. One only has to bring to mind the "Standards Wars" in technology (e.g., DOS-Windows vs.
Mac operating systems): the better standard is not always the one to eventually win out; many times it is the convention that gets established first that remains in effect. For example, Bikhchandani et al. [9] discuss how quickly such convention may get established in the presence of noisy signals.
Using evolutionary game theory [46, 45] , we examine different transaction models, including different strategies, by both buyers and sellers in traditional markets and electronic markets, and illustrate which transaction equilibrium is stable and can be established as the prevailing convention in the long run. In the next section, we describe two main factors that affect the market evolution process: the characteristics of the products involved in market transactions and the market participants' learning behavior.
Major Determinants of Market Evolution: Product Characteristics and Learning Paradigms
As e-commerce develops, many companies have come to realize that on the web, not all products are equal. Products possess both different characteristics and qualitative differences of the same characteristics. Therefore, understanding the role of product characteristics and how these characteristics might affect consumers' shopping behavior is important for understanding transaction strategies.
Since the inception of commercial activities on the Internet, information asymmetry has been perceived by some to be a significant barrier to the extensive acceptance of the electronic market [5, 12] . Among the many aspects of information asymmetry, product quality uncertainty is closely related to online fraud: trading parties often do not have the same information about the product quality. For example, when bidders view a product listing at an online auction site, they may not have easy access to information regarding the true quality of the product. Recognizing the difficulty of guaranteeing product quality, eBay excuses itself from the responsibility in its User Agreement, saying the company "has no control over the quality, safety or legality of the items advertised, the truth or accuracy of the listings." 1 Without a doubt, information asymmetry exposes electronic market participants to more risks and fraudulent transactions.
Understanding product characteristics is essential to consumers' ability to appraise product quality online, which consequently affects their shopping behaviors. Hotelling's spatial-competition model [25] has long demonstrated that in addition to price, product characteristics such as quality, color, and shopping place also determine from which seller a buyer will buy a certain product. For example, the quality of commodity products such as stock shares and paper clips can be clearly and contractually articulated and conveyed.
Touching and feeling such products are unnecessary. The convenience of being able to browse the Internet in one's own living room has added value. On the other hand, sales of products such as artwork, which has a strong look and feel nature, will be highly affected by information asymmetry. De Figueiredo [14] develops an e-commerce product continuum in which he characterizes products into commodity products (e.g., oil, paper clips), quasi-commodity products (e.g., books, CDs, videos), "look and feel" products (e.g., suits, homes), and "look and feel" products with variable quality (e.g., art). Ceteris paribus, quality is easiest to judge on the web for commodity products but most difficult to judge for "look and feel" products with variable quality. For the latter, direct experience adds to the customer's total utility. Buyers need to actually touch, feel, try on or see these products in person before they buy. A simple description would not be enough for a discerning shopper.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with products that are commonly traded in a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or business-to-consumer (B2C) environment, but are not widely available, for example, collector's items such as rare coins or stamps, specialty products such as very specific photographic lenses, or works of art that are hard to find. Such products may be commodity products or "look and feel" products. For instance, the characteristics of lenses are well defined and well described as quasicommodity products, but the vast assortment means that not many choices are kept in stock. These items may be offered for sale through on-line auctions (by individual sellers or small retailers); or may be available from (small) retailer's Web sites. In the physical world, such items are sold by a small number of (specialty) stores or individuals (e.g., through classified ads). In these situations, the matching of buyers and sellers is difficult.
Our model does not apply to transactions involving large e-tailers (such as Amazon.com).
Such transactions are better modelled as Stackelberg games where the large e-tailer is a long-term player who would be committed to its Stackelberg strategy.
In addition to product characteristics, traders' adaptive behavior may also affect their choice of transaction models, and thus the evolution of the market. In this paper, we investigate how information used by the transacting parties influences their behavior and in turn determines the evolutionary path of the market system.
The dynamics of a system are determined by how players adapt their strategies, or what learning paradigms they use. There are different ways of adaptive play that are mostly influenced by the players' cognitive abilities and the information or memory the players possess [46] . Therefore, we model the market dynamics in two different ways, each with their own interpretation in an e-commerce environment.
The first method of learning we study is one of Natural Selection, a term coined by biologists to indicate that species with superior strategies would create more offspring than others and hence be "naturally selected" [44] . The second learning paradigm we use to investigate the market dynamics is the Best Reply model, an adaptive mechanism that has been studied by game theorists (see, e.g. [21] ). Here players optimize their expected payoff given what they expect others to do. The expectation of others' behavior is derived from a sample of the histories of other players' past actions. In this model, information about other players' past actions is a necessity, and every player must be willing to use that information as an indicator of future behavior. Therefore, a mechanism such as eBay's Feedback Forum that disseminates information about the players' past behavior becomes critical. In addition, we allow every player to "deviate" from the optimal strategy with a very small probability. That is, a player sometimes may want to experiment with a strategy that is not necessarily optimal based upon his historical information: the player may make a mistake, or is bound by limited information processing capability, or just plainly wants to do something different and comes up with a strategy that does not yield the highest expected payoff.
Although seemingly related, the two learning paradigms model two different processes: Natural Selection models the diffusion of behavior throughout the population (where the behavior of the individual decision maker is abstracted out), whereas the Best Reply paradigm models the evolution of the actions of an individual (rational) decision maker. The first model requires the least cognitive abilities: the players do not need a memory of past plays; neither do they need to compute an optimal strategy. The Best
Reply model assumes that players have access to a history of plays, that they are willing to use that information to guide future actions, and that they can compute the optimal strategy given the available information.
The two different learning models do not yield the same outcomes. The natural selection model gives rise to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) that form evolutionarily stable equilibria in which no small group with a "mutant" strategy (i.e., one that deviates from the ESS) can successfully invade the population (i.e., get a higher payoff). An evolutionarily stable equilibrium is not necessarily unique and depends strongly on the initial conditions of the system. Different starting conditions may yield different final equilibria.
The equilibrium of the best reply model, by contrast, is always unique (save for ties in the payoffs of the conventions). The resulting equilibrium is a stochastically stable equilibrium (SSE) which is independent of the initial conditions of the system. A SSE is a convention that, among several Nash equilibria, is asymptotically observed with positive probability.
Either an evolutionarily stable equilibrium or a stochastically stable equilibrium is a convention that gets established as the most prevailing convention over time. An ESS is a convention that survives all other conventions because the ESS strategies give the players the highest payoff and choosing another strategy by a small number of players gives a lower payoff. On the other hand, the SSE is the convention that is played most frequently over time. In other words, a convention other than the SSE may be played for a short amount of time but the process will quickly revert back to the SSE. In section 4, we identify the corresponding prevailing convention based on the learning paradigm the players choose. For further comparisons between ESSs and SSEs, we refer the reader to the abundant literature on Evolutionary Game Theory, such as Young [45] .
The Evolution of Market Transactions

Modeling Assumptions
Modeling buyer-seller behavior is a difficult task. Consumer Behavior literature [2, 33] distinguishes types of buying processes broadly as "planned" (e.g., a completely rational buying decision) and "unplanned" buying (e.g., impulse buying). Within these categories, different phases have been identified. For planned buying, these phases consist of need identification, evaluation of alternatives and finally choice of outlet. In each phase, the consumer acquires information and hence incurs some search cost. The buying process may be abandoned during any of these phases. Different unplanned buying transactions, on the other hand, have varying phases and may not even succeed in the same manner.
In order to abstract away from the different buying processes and search costs, we model vendors and buyers as playing a game with asymmetric strategies where they are randomly matched with each other. Although implicit, we assume that the seller has decided on a transaction channel(s) first, but the buyer is not aware of the seller's choice.
When the buyer decides to purchase a product, she chooses a channel and tries to identify a seller who has a product that satisfies her need. In principle, we assume trade is possible, but only if the consumer and the vendor choose a compatible transaction channel. If not, the possibility of trade is forgone for now and the buyer/vendor may match in the future when compatible modes are chosen (or the buyer may abandon the buying process). By not allowing a trade, we implicitly model search cost: the gains from trade will only be realized later, incurring an "opportunity cost" which accounts for the search cost as well. The choice of a compatible transaction channel plays an important role in the different stages of planned buying: acquiring information and final purchase are only possible when buyers and sellers communicate through the same channel. Unplanned buying (especially impulse buying), on the other hand, is to a large extent conditioned on which transaction channel is chosen. In essence, buyers and sellers face a coordination problem [36] : potential buyers and sellers may not know of each other's existence and both parties have to make a choice on where to look for the other party.
We model an asymmetric game played by a seller with seven strategies and a buyer with four strategies (Table 1) . Overall, both the seller and the buyer may adopt the traditional transaction channel (transaction in a physical store) or the electronic transaction channel (transaction online). Specifically, both the seller and the buyer may have the following four common strategies: traditional transaction (TT), cheating on electronic transaction (ET c ) (e.g., the fly-by-night strategy), playing honest on electronic transaction (ET h ), and electronic transaction through a TTP (ETTP) (e.g., using an online escrow service, authentication service or other trusted third party). Moreover, the seller may offer both traditional transaction and electronic transaction simultaneously, therefore having three additional strategies: traditional transaction or playing honest on electronic transaction (ET h /TT), traditional transaction or electronic transaction through TTP (ETTP/TT), and traditional transaction or playing honest on electronic transaction or electronic transaction through a TTP (ET h /ETTP/TT). We assume sellers will not cheat if they have physical stores, since we are only concerned with incremental cheating behavior specifically enabled by the electronic channels. In addition, since buyers always purchase products through a pure transaction channel, we do not model buyers with strategies combining multiple channels, as this would mean that the buyer's search costs are increased and we won't be able to model search costs implicitly as the opportunity cost of trade lost. This framework can apply to the B2C market (e.g., small on-line retailers of electronics such as the ones rated on (www.resellerratings.com) or the C2C market (e.g., on-line auction markets). According to a recent FBI report [38] , such markets have the highest cases of on-line fraud, and the number of fraud cases is rising at an increasing rate every year.
---Insert Table 1 [7, 16, 34] . On the other hand, for "look and feel" products, because of the added utility from touching and seeing the product before purchase, we assume that on average
If one of the trading parties plays ET h but the other plays ET c , the cheating party will get a payoff of g x + , where g is the extra gain from cheating, and the cheated will In the next two subsections, we will demonstrate that the two learning paradigms discussed in section 3 yield different outcomes for market evolution, and that only the best reply model yields a unique equilibrium. We will discuss learning by natural selection in Section 4.2, and the best reply model in Section 4.3.
Learning by Natural Selection or Imitation
We first study the dynamics of the market when buyers and sellers of commodity and quasi-commodity products use the least information and adapt their strategy based on the results of their past behavior or of peers' results (e.g., buyers communicating to other buyers the average payoffs of their strategy). Less successful traders adjust their strategies and switch to a new strategy that they perceive as more successful, i.e., having higher average payoffs. We start with an initial distribution of buyers and sellers playing strategies i and j, respectively. After a certain number of trades, players with the lowest total payoff in the population consider changing their strategy. We repeat this process long enough until the system becomes stable, i.e., until an ESS is reached. It is known that for an asymmetric game the evolutionarily stable equilibrium corresponds to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [39] . We introduce an agent-based simulation to get insight into the evolutionary path and the robustness of the equilibrium as a function of the initial conditions and other parameters of the system. A similar evolutionary game theory approach based on simulation has been applied to a wide variety of economic problems, from analyzing the evolution of bargaining [10] to the evolution of the medium of exchange in an economy [23] .
Our agent-based simulation has a population of N buyers and N sellers. Note that our regeneration of strategies is more conservative than the standard replicator dynamics (the replicator dynamics is ) ( π and t π are the average payoffs for type i and the overall average payoff respectively in time t) used in evolutionary dynamics (see, e.g., [18] ). The latter has a growth rate proportional to the average payoffs of the types, whereas our growth rate is proportional to the players who decide not to change their strategy, and in general is slower than the replicator dynamics. The intuition behind our growth rate is that we assume in our setting that players who want to switch their strategy may have an idea about which strategy is performing better (because more players are using it or other players are sticking to their strategy), but they do not observe other players' average payoffs (as it would be hard to get information about others' exact payoffs).
After running many simulations, a typical outcome for the evolution of the buyers' strategy in a market with commodity goods is displayed in Figures 1 and 2 . In both cases, the distribution of buyers' (as well as sellers') strategies was uniform; Figure   1 starts out with buyers evenly distributed over the four strategies, while Figure 2 has twice as many buyers playing TT than the other three strategies. In Figure 1 , the evolutionarily stable equilibrium becomes (ETTP, ETTP), while in the second situation it is (TT, TT). The outcomes seem to be robust for different values of the payoffs and different values of θ, T and ε (ε determines the convergence rate: the lower ε is, the faster the equilibrium is reached). The graphs for sellers' strategies look similar.
---Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here --- Figure 3 displays the same situation, with the difference that the number of Honest Buyers/Sellers (ET h /ET h ) is high and there are no people playing ET c in the beginning (the only ET c strategy is a mutant strategy). We would like to see which equilibrium would appear in this case, and find out whether (ET h , ET h ) will become the equilibrium. It turns out that despite the abundance of ET h players (both buyers and sellers), (ET h , ET h ) is not an evolutionarily stable equilibrium as could be expected. Again, Figure 3 only displays the evolution of buyer strategies, but the evolution of seller strategies looks similar. It is interesting to follow the behavior of the system: at first honest players are being forced out by dishonest players, but then since there are only dishonest players left, it becomes favorable to play a strategy that's robust against cheating: ETTP or TT. When dishonest players have been weeded out, the ETTP strategy takes over as the dominant strategy because of the higher payoffs and becomes the eventual ESS.
---Insert Figure 3 here ---In conclusion, if the transacting parties adapt their behavior by imitating more successful behavior, ETTP becomes the ESS in most of the cases. That is, ETTP becomes the new convention for market transaction. Only when there is a dominant proportion of traders who insist on transacting over the physical channel does TT become the ESS. However, as will be seen in the next section, when traders use historical information about strategies played by the other party, the stochastically stable equilibrium for commodity and quasi-commodity products is always ETTP.
For "look and feel" products, similar phenomena were observed. That is, the final ESS was dependent upon the initial distribution of the strategies in the population. But the dependence is more pronounced. In addition, the ESS was also a function of the relative payoffs of ETTP and TT for the buyers and sellers. That is, for "look and feel" products, the payoff for buyers (on average) is higher using TT than using ETTP, whereas for the seller the opposite holds (operating an electronic channel is always considered less expensive than maintaining a physical outlet, regardless of product In conclusion, we can say that the simulations show that unless the initial distribution of the population is predominantly playing one pure strategy (such as TT), the final ESS becomes the socially desired one, i.e., the Nash equilibrium with the highest social welfare. Thus, switching channels to the most socially preferred channel (in terms of welfare) is most likely to take place, when the initial population is not already locked into another (inferior) convention.
The Best Reply Model
In the best reply model it is assumed that players We first need some preliminary results. In the following, define ( )
to be the length of a shortest directed path in the best reply graph from a strategy-tuple s to a strict Nash equilibrium.
Lemma: The game from Table 1 is a weakly acyclic game 2 and
Proof.
See Appendix.
The consequences of the lemma are that the conventions of a weakly acyclic game are always pure strategy Nash equilibria and that if
, then the best reply behavior converges almost surely to a convention. The fact that the sample size k should be less than or equal to 20% of the available history m, is not a severe restriction:
typically there exists an abundance of feedback reviews about past transactions such that a player computing a best reply strategy will only sample a small subset of this available information. Therefore, in the game described in Table 1 , with incomplete sampling, which introduces stochastic variation into the players' responses, a possibility exists that the players will coordinate by chance, and if they do so frequently enough the process eventually converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the model stated in Table 1 , there are only two pure strategy Nash equilibria:
(ETTP, ETTP), and (TT, TT) for both commodity/quasi-commodity products and "look and feel" products. Note that there is a unique Pareto optimum (ET h , ET h ), but it is not a Nash equilibrium. This follows from the well-known fact that the subgame consisting of the strategies ET c and ET h is a "prisoner's dilemma" game [20] . Hence, this Pareto optimum is not attainable without imposing further rules, if we assume that both players are free agents. Even when the prisoner's dilemma game is played repeatedly, we know that it does not necessarily give us a Pareto-optimal outcome. Therefore, the question now is: which strategy will be the prevailing convention with the existence of the electronic market?
Presently, traditional transactions have been a widely accepted practice for many years whereas electronic commerce is only a recent phenomenon enabled by network technologies. As we mentioned before, the traditional market is a social-economic Nash equilibrium that has been functioning properly. People are comfortable with the mechanisms embedded in the current equilibrium: there are mechanisms in the traditional market to facilitate transactions, such as payment settlement methods and trust building mechanisms (for example, credit systems, rating agencies). Therefore, there is no incentive for business parties to deviate from it. The new electronic market, while offering many advantages, inevitably involves risks, some of which being the security concerns and product quality uncertainties. Although these risks can be mitigated through trusted third parties, moving into a new equilibrium takes time and learning.
Given the existence of multiple Nash equilibria and the current institutional infrastructure that is functional for TT, will the market eventually learn to use TTPs? We use the stochastically stable equilibrium theory [46] to study the process. Simply speaking, stochastically stable equilibria are calculated by finding the paths of least resistance among equilibria, and then discovering the equilibrium among them that has the lowest overall resistance. This represents a special case of a general theorem on perturbed Markov processes [17] that characterizes their stochastically stable states graphtheoretically.
Let Γ be a 2-person asymmetric game. Let i S be the finite set of strategies . The histories are assumed to be anonymous: it is not important who exactly played a given strategy in a given period.
What is important is the information that a given strategy was played by someone.
The following is the rule for players to choose their strategies: Fix integers k and
. In time period t + 1 ( m t ≥ ) each player examines k plays which are drawn without replacement from the most recent m periods 1 ,..., 2 , 1 ,
The draws made by each player are independent. 3 We assume that every subset of k has a positive probability of being Player 1 or Player 2's information. 4 For the sake of generality we can assume that the first m plays are randomly selected. Therefore, in
, the sampling process starts from some arbitrary initial sequence of m
Theorem 1: (ETTP, ETTP) is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium for commodity and quasi-commodity products (that is, when
Proof:
For "look and feel" products, we assume that b b b a < since the buyer's payoff is higher when the product can be experienced in a traditional store, but a seller's cost of operating a physical store is assumed to be higher than operating an electronic channel, even with the costs of using a TTP added in, i.e., Proof.
Corollary 2 is interpreted as follows: when the buyer's relative gain in payoff (i.e., b b a b ) from using a traditional channel is higher than the cost savings the seller would realize from using the ETTP strategy (i.e., 
Market Transformation and Conclusion
The above analyses indicate that due to the nature of the product, the market will have some divergence. Some products are more suitable for the electronic market, while others are more suitable for the traditional physical market, and one expects both types of markets to co-exist. The market divergence results from market participants' adaptive behavior and the product characteristics.
We recognize that many online transactions may not need TTP services. For example, when a consumer buys a book from Amazon.com which is perceived as an honest seller, the consumer most likely feels confident that Amazon will not suddenly switch to an opportunistic strategy. There is a significant segment of online transactions, learn that transacting in the electronic market using a TTP yields higher payoffs. While we agree that the transformation could be a very long process, and we do not expect that the above payoff structure would hold for every transaction, the electronic market with TTPs will surely emerge as the dominant environment for conducting commerce in the future for certain products. The equilibrium level of use depends upon the extent of its economic advantages over the traditional market it competes with.
One question critical to the transformation from the traditional market to the electronic market is how well consumers are able to evaluate characteristics of goods in the digital environment. At the moment, the most frequently purchased products online are books, music CDs, software CDs, video games, hardware, and electronics [43] . That is, consumers are buying digital products, e.g., digital CD, software, entertainment products, as well as other information based products that can be digitized and delivered via the network efficiently. They are also buying products that are physical goods but whose characteristics are well known or easy to perceive on the network (e.g., commodity or quasi-commodity products such as paper clips and books). For most look and feel goods, however, consumers still resort to the traditional market due to the difficulties of evaluating the characteristics of goods online and our analysis would suggest that this would remain so. For example, many consumers prefer to buy fruits in a traditional grocery store because they can better choose the color and ripeness of the fruit than ordering online. For companies planning to compete in the electronic market, they need to carefully devise their strategy based on their product offering and provide information that is designed to help consumers understand their products. In addition, strategic alliances with well-established businesses or trusted third parties may be needed to enhance their reputation and trustworthiness with potential customers.
During this transformation process from the traditional market to the electronic market, the invention of new technology and acceptance of new technology will be a fundamental force. New technology utilized by vendors' storefronts will provide more possibilities for consumers to evaluate product characteristics. For example, with virtual reality, "people may try clothes on the Internet" [22] . Products that require direct personal experience may one day relax the requirement. Moreover, various Trusted Third Parties will come out and add value for buyers and sellers in the electronic market.
In that case, the electronic market with TTPs still dominates as the convention, no matter what market participants' learning behaviors are. Obviously, the development of electronic commerce exerts immense pressure on the current technology applied in the electronic market. We believe that the emergence of new technologies in electronic markets will eventually make most of the conversion a reality.
Another force fueling the transformation from traditional markets to electronic markets is that brought about by network externalities [3, 28] , which means that the value of electronic markets increase as more people use them. As more and more consumers jump onto the Internet bandwagon, the electronic market will become a marketplace that merchants cannot ignore. As a result, merchants can provide more product choices, thus attracting more customers. Therefore, network externalities encourage the use of electronic transactions -the more online transactions, the lower the setup and transaction costs. Positive network externalities are implicit in our model because the more people use a certain strategy, the easier it is to transact with them using that same strategy.
A limitation of this research is that our current model only applies to online C2C markets and B2C markets where online merchants do not have an established reputation.
Relaxing some of the assumptions in the evolutionary game theoretic model might provide a more general framework that can be used to analyse the overall market transformation, including the business-to-business (B2B) markets. In addition, empirical research examining transaction patterns and their evolution over time in markets such as eBay will complement and hopefully confirm our analytical results. This will be the next step in this line of research.
In conclusion, using an evolutionary game theory approach, we analyzed conventional and electronic markets, and demonstrated that there are two different conventions under two different payoff structures resulting from the different natures of products. Therefore, traditional markets and electronic markets will co-exist under the current technological and social environment.
With the development of new technologies, however, "virtual reality" may become a possibility. The implementation of virtual reality to convey product characteristics too complex to be conveyed by current technologies could lead to increased electronic transactions facilitated by TTP.
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Appendix:
Lemma: The game from Table 1 is a weakly acyclic game 5 and
Proof.
In Table 1 (ET h , ET h ), then one of the shortest directed path is from (ET h , ET h ) to (ET h , ET c ), then to 5 A game is weakly acyclic if, and only if, from every strategy-tuple there exists a finite sequence of best replies by one agent at a time that ends in a strict, pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Young 1993 
Proof.
According to Young [46] , if … , (ETTP, ETTP)) 6 . To determine which of the two states is stochastically stable, we have to compute the path of least resistance from h 1 to h 2 , and also from h 2 to h 1 .
Suppose h 1 is the state at time t=m. To make the transition from h 1 to h 2 requires at least one player choosing ETTP to do an experiment (or make a mistake).
Furthermore, the player must choose strategy ETTP so often that the other player's optimal reply is also strategy ETTP for at least one sample of size k. Otherwise, the transition from h 1 to h 2 will not occur.
The following example is provided to explain how the transition could happen (Table A1 ).
---Insert Table A1 here ---Assume that Player 1 adopts ETTP by trying an experiment from periods
on Player 1 switches back to play TT. The experimental choices are marked ETTP* in Table 2 .
We have discussed how the players choose their strategies previously. That is, fix integers k and m such that m k ≤ ≤ 1 . In period t+1 ( m t ≥ ) each player examines k plays drawn without replacement from the most recent m periods t, t-1, t-2, …, t-m+1. If Player 2 draws a sample that includes these ' k choices of ETTP, as well as ' k k − choices of TT, then Player 2's optimal reply is ETTP if the following equality holds:
That is,
If the above equality holds, then strategy ETTP is among Player 2's best replies.
Therefore, Player 2 will play ETTP with positive probability. In Table 1 , for commodity or quasi-commodity goods, 
